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+# Evidence chain · roadmap
+
+The evidence chain is the set of cryptographic + procedural mechanisms that make a Blocao clip **third-party verifiable** as an authentic, untampered record of what happened at a specific time and place.
+
+This is a separate workstream from the MVP. See [ADR-0007](../../decisions/0007-evidence-chain-postpone.md) for the rationale.
+
+## Two layers
+
+The roadmap is split into:
+
+- **Layer 1 (MVP)**: enough to demonstrate good-faith integrity. Ships in the demo path.
+- **Layer 2 (post-MVP)**: third-party-verifiable, eIDAS-aligned, suitable for legal proceedings.
+
+## Layer 1 (MVP) — Good-faith integrity
+
+Ships by end of Sprint 4 in the basic flow, end of Sprint 7 fully polished.
+
+### What it provides
+
+For every recorded clip:
+
+- **SHA256** computed at write time, stored in the manifest.
+- **Manifest JSON** with: cam_id, sha_clip, sha_keyframe, ts_local, ts_nts, model_sha, site_id, operator_id (when manually pinned).
+- **Cell-local signature** over the manifest, using a key generated at first boot.
+- **NTS-anchored timestamp** (Network Time Security, RFC 8915) so the clock is trustworthy.
+- **Append-only manifest log** in the Cell, replicated to the hub.
+
+### What it doesn't provide
+
+- Timestamp not from a third-party TSA (just NTS — better than naive NTP, less than RFC 3161).
+- Signature key not customer-controlled (BYOK is L2).
+- No transparency log replication to a third party.
+- No FIDO2-attested operator actions.
+
+### Sufficient for
+
+- Internal investigations.
+- Insurance claims (most insurers).
+- "Show me what happened" forensic playback.
+- Customers who trust Blocao Labs as the issuer.
+
+### Not sufficient for
+
+- Court evidence in jurisdictions requiring eIDAS-qualified TSA.
+- Adversarial proceedings where the evidence will be challenged.
+- Regulated industries with specific evidence-chain requirements.
+
+## Layer 2 (post-MVP) — Legal-grade
+
+Targeted for end of Year 1 / start of Year 2.
+
+### What L2 adds
+
+- **RFC 3161 TSA timestamps**: each manifest is signed by a third-party Time Stamp Authority (eIDAS-qualified TSA in EU; ANSSI-recognized for FR; equivalent in other jurisdictions).
+- **Transparency log replication**: manifests append to a public-or-private transparency log (Sigstore-style or custom). External parties can verify "this manifest was published by date X".
+- **BYOK (Bring Your Own Key)**: customer-controlled root key, sealed with Tang+Clevis or HashiCorp Vault. Blocao Labs never sees the key.
+- **FIDO2-attested operator actions**: when an operator pins a clip to a case or exports an evidence pack, the action is attested with a FIDO2 hardware token. Provides non-repudiation.
+- **Tamper-evident export packages**: evidence packs are sealed with a reproducible hash chain that any verifier can check independently.
+
+### What this enables
+
+- Court-grade evidence in EU jurisdictions accepting eIDAS qualified electronic signatures.
+- Defensible chain of custody in adversarial proceedings.
+- Regulated-industry compliance (banking, healthcare with specific evidence rules).
+- Independent third-party verification ("I have this clip, was it created by Blocao on date X?" verifiable without trusting Blocao Labs or the customer).
+
+### What it still doesn't provide
+
+- Proof that what's recorded is not staged or manipulated *at the source* (no AI/CGI detection).
+- Identity of people in frame (separate workstream — facial recognition, with its own legal complexity).
+
+## Implementation notes
+
+### TSA selection
+
+For EU operations: select a qualified TSA from the EU Trusted List (e.g., one of the certificate authorities recognized under eIDAS). Multiple TSAs supported for redundancy.
+
+For Argentina / LATAM: ONTI-recognized TSA where available, fall back to international TSA with documented basis.
+
+### Transparency log
+
+Two options:
+
+1. **Public log** (Sigstore-style Rekor instance): maximum transparency, but exposes site_id metadata.
+2. **Private log** (customer-operated or Blocao-operated, audited): reasonable transparency, less metadata exposure.
+
+Default: customer-operated private log on the hub, with optional mirror to public log when customer policy allows.
+
+### BYOK key custody
+
+Three patterns:
+
+1. **Customer-managed root** with Tang+Clevis: customer holds the unlock policy, Cells decrypt at boot.
+2. **HashiCorp Vault** integration: customer's Vault server provides unsealing.
+3. **HSM-based** (rare): customer has a hardware HSM, Cells request signatures over network.
+
+Pattern 1 is the default and easiest to operate. Pattern 2/3 for higher-security customers.
+
+### FIDO2 attestation flow
+
+Operator clicks "PIN TO CASE" → console requests FIDO2 attestation from operator's hardware token (YubiKey or platform authenticator) → attestation included in the action's MQTT publish + manifest annotation.
+
+Without FIDO2 token: action is logged but not attested. Higher-tier customers may require FIDO2 for all sensitive operations.
+
+## Roadmap timing
+
+| Phase | Milestone | Target |
+|---|---|---|
+| L1 basic | SHA + manifest + Cell signature | End of Sprint 4 |
+| L1 polish | NTS-anchored ts in manifest, append-only log replicated to hub | End of Sprint 7 |
+| L2 alpha | RFC 3161 TSA integration, single TSA | Year 1 Q4 |
+| L2 beta | Transparency log replication, BYOK | Year 2 Q1 |
+| L2 GA | FIDO2-attested operator actions, full eIDAS alignment | Year 2 Q2 |
+
+## Sales conversation patterns
+
+**Customer asks**: "Are your clips court-admissible?"
+
+**Today**: "We sign every clip with a manifest including content hash and trusted-time anchor. For most use cases — internal investigations, insurance claims, civil proceedings where evidence isn't strenuously challenged — that's been sufficient. For criminal proceedings or aggressive civil challenges, evidence chain v2 with RFC 3161 timestamps and transparency log is on our Year 2 roadmap."
+
+**Customer asks**: "Can the customer hold their own keys?"
+
+**Today**: "BYOK is on our Year 2 roadmap. Today, the keys are managed by the Cell with a customer-recoverable seal. Discuss your specific requirements with us."
+
+**Customer asks**: "Do you support eIDAS qualified electronic signatures?"
+
+**Today**: "Not yet at the qualified-TSA level. Our Year 2 roadmap is explicitly building toward eIDAS alignment. If this is a deal requirement, let's discuss whether we can prioritize for your deployment."
+
+## Why L1 is enough for MVP
+
+The vast majority of forensic use cases don't go to court. Most surveillance recordings are reviewed internally, used for insurance, or for operational decisions. L1 is sufficient for these.
+
+Going to court is rare; when it happens, courts increasingly accept "best-effort cryptographic chain" with appropriate expert witness explanation. L1 supports that.
+
+L2 is the fortress version, for the customers who need it. We build it as a platform feature available on demand, not as a prerequisite.